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Two papers have recently questioned the quantitative consistency
of the search and matching models. Shimer (2005) has argued that a
text-book matching model is unable to explain the cyclical variation
of unemployment and vacancies in the U.S. economy. Costain and
Reiter (2007) have found the existence of a trade-oﬀ in the model’s
performance: any attempt to change the calibrated values in order
to amend such business cycle inability would jeopardize the model’s
predictions about the impact of unemployment beneﬁts on the hazard
rate. In surveying the literature originated in these ﬁndings, I distin-
guish three diﬀerent avenues that have been followed to correct the
model: change in wage formation, change in the calibration, changes
in the model speciﬁcation. The last approach seems to reach the best
results both from a business cycle and from a microeconomic view-
point.
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11 Introduction
In a inﬂuential paper, Shimer (2005) evaluates the business cycle perfor-
mance of the matching models, nowadays the standard workhorse adopted
by macro and labour economists to study aggregate labour markets1. The
most important claims of his paper can be summarized as follows:
1. A textbook search and matching model is not able to explain the ob-
served ﬂuctuations of unemployment and vacancies in the U.S. econ-
omy in response to productivity shocks of plausible magnitude. The
job-ﬁnding rate results 12 times more volatile in the data than in the
model, whereas the standard deviation of the vacancies in the data is
10 times larger than in the model.
2. Such discrepancy stems from the wage formation assumptions. In a
standard matching model, a Nash bargaining solution is introduced in
order to share the total surplus between the ﬁrm and the worker. When
a positive productivity shock hits the economy, wages instantaneously
increase, dampening vacancy creation. Thus, vacancies (and, as a con-
sequence, the job ﬁnding rate) are much more variable in the data than
in the model.
3. The model also exhibits no propagation as it implies a contemporaneous
correlation between the vacancy-unemployment ratio and productivity
of −1, while in the data it is about −0.4.
The aim of this paper is to present the literature sprung from Shimer’s ﬁnd-
ings. As far as the ﬁrst two claims are concerned, I distinguish three diﬀerent
avenues that have been taken up by scholars.
In the ﬁrst group, I list papers that agree with Shimer’s ﬁrst and second
claims: the model fails to replicate the U.S. business cycle facts because wages
are too responsive to changes in productivity. Hence, the most straightfor-
ward way to reconcile model and data is to modify the wage formation rules,
for instance introducing some form of wage stickiness or imposing imperfect
information in the ﬁrm-worker negotiation.
Although the sticky wage hypothesis has gained the initial attention of
many economists, two caveats cast some doubts that it is the right answer to
2the lack of ampliﬁcation exhibited by the model. First, wage stickiness (or
even a completely rigid wage) is not suﬃcient to ﬁt the model with the data;
a low calibrated proﬁt share is also needed, so that the percentage increase
in proﬁts is large for a given percentage increase in productivity, boosting
vacancy creation.2 Second, as Pissarides (2007) and Haefke, Sonntag, and van
Rens (2007) have recently pointed out, introducing sticky wage mechanisms
in matching models is diﬃcult to justify on empirical ground. What is key
in amplifying ﬂuctuations is the cyclical behaviour of the wages of the newly
hired workers. To augment the unemployment and vacancy volatility these
wages must be sticky, while data show a near-proportional relation between
them and labour productivity.
A second avenue is pursued by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2007a; b). They
do not agree on Shimer’s ﬁrst two conclusions. According to them, the
model is unable to match the data because of an erroneous parametrization
of two key parameters: the instantaneous utility of being unemployed and
workers’ bargaining power. With a higher calibrated value for the utility of
unemployment and a lower bargaining power for workers, the model succeeds
in replicating the observed business cycle ﬂuctuations.
Even this second approach has been called in question on diﬀerent grounds.
Mortensen and Nagyp´ al (2007b) claim that Hagedorn and Manovskii’s parametriza-
tion postulates a too small and unrealistic diﬀerence between the instanta-
neous utility in employment and unemployment.
Costain and Reiter (2007) verify the quantitative consistency of the model
not only in response to productivity and separation rate shocks, but also to
changes in the level of unemployment beneﬁts (UBs). The conclusion is that
any attempt to calibrate a standard matching model in order to match the
business cycle unemployment and vacancies data produces unrealistic results
about the eﬀects of an increase in UBs on the unemployment rate, and vice
versa. As a possible answer to the ampliﬁcation puzzle, Costain and Reiter
propose the introduction of embodied technological progress.
This naturally leads to a third way Shimer’s ﬁndings have been con-
fronted. What this vein of the literature (more or less) implicitly argues is
that a standard matching framework contains some simpliﬁed assumptions
that inevitably jeopardize the quantitative consistency of the model. En-
3riching the basic set-up - considering for instance turnover costs, on-the-job
search, or market power - would bridge the gap between data and theory.
This last approach seems the most successful in ameliorating the quan-
titative performance of the model, both at business cycle and at a policy
analysis level. In particular, assuming cohort-speciﬁc productivity shocks as
in Costain and Reiter (2007) and Reiter (2007) or introducing turnover costs
as in Silva and Toledo (2007) improves the business cycle performance of the
model and ﬁts the microeconomic estimates, while keeping it analytically
tractable.
A ﬁnal remark concerns the lack of propagation exhibited by the model.
Compared to the ampliﬁcation puzzle explained above, this problem has
gained much less attention among the scholars. Fujita (2003), Fujita and
Ramey (2007b), and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2007b) have focused on this
issue, caused by the excessive responsiveness of vacancies to the shocks. They
show that the introduction of planning lags or increasing marginal costs in
vacancy creation ameliorates the dynamics the model.
Related Surveys
The present paper is not the ﬁrst survey that aims to present Shimer’s claims
and the subsequent literature they spurred.
In a detailed review, Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2005) clearly spell
out the importance of a low proﬁt share to better the performance of the
model and explain the crucial diﬀerences between Shimer and Hagedorn and
Manovskii’s calibration. Since the publication of their article, however, many
other papers have tried to answer to Shimer’s points, focusing in particular
on the aforementioned third approach. The present survey tries to account
for this more recent strand of research.
Costain and Reiter (2007), Mortensen and Nagyp´ al (2007b), and Pis-
sarides (2007), while taking part to the contest by proposing alternative
ways to ﬁt the model with the data, also provide helpful summaries of the
state-of-the-art literature. Of course, the main objective of these papers is
not to be a survey and some works are not presented there.
Finally, Yashiv (2007a)’s survey covers a much wider subject, namely the
recent advances in macroeconomic models with search frictions in the labour
4market. So, the so-called Shimer critique occupies only a fraction of the
topics covered in his work3.
Structure of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical and the-
oretical framework. Section 3 presents the quantitative inconsistency of the
model. Sections 4, 5, and 6 respectively survey the three diﬀerent approaches
followed to react Shimer’s claims. Section 7 deals with the propagation prob-
lem. Section 8 concludes.
2 Empirical and Theoretical Framework
2.1 U.S. Labour Market Facts
Table 1, taken from Shimer (2005), summarizes the statistics on the economic
variables of interest. In bold are the numbers on which scholars have con-
centrated more. I ﬁrst present Shimer’s data collection method and then, in
section 2.2, I brieﬂy discuss the diﬀerences with the previous literature. The
variables are the following: u unemployment, v vacancies, f the job-ﬁnding
rate, s the separation rate, and p labour productivity. Data are quarterly
and refers to the period from 1951 to 2003.4
What emerges from a ﬁrst inspection of the data is the relatively high
volatility of the level of unemployment and vacancies. The standard deviation
of unemployment σu is equal to 0.19, meaning that this variable can be as
much as 38 percent above or below trend. Since unemployment is counter-
cyclical and vacancies are pro-cyclical, labour market tightness, deﬁned as
θ ≡ v/u, is extremely pro-cyclical. Moreover, both unemployment and
vacancies are very persistent variables, with an autocorrelation around 0.94.
Shimer assumes a constant returns to scale matching technology, m(v,u),
increasing and concave in both arguments, representing the measure of new
jobs created as a function of the level of unemployment u and vacancies
v. Because of the CRS assumption, the job-ﬁnding rate f ≡ m(v,u)/u =
m(θ,1) is an increasing and concave function of θ only. Shimer gets an
average monthly hazard rate around 0.45 and a standard deviation of 0.1185.
5u v v/u f s p
Standard deviation 0.190 0.202 0.382 0.118 0.075 0.020
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.936 0.940 0.941 0.908 0.733 0.878
Correlation matrix
u 1 -0.894 -0.971 -0.949 0.709 -0.408
v - 1 0.975 0.897 -0.684 0.364
v /u - - 1 0.948 -0.715 0.396
f - - - 1 -0.574 0.396
s - - - - 1 -0.524
p - - - - - 1
Table 1. Shimer’s summary statistics. Quarterly U.S Data 1951-2003. All variables
are reported in logs as deviations from an HP trend with smoothing parameter
105. Source: Shimer (2005).
As Shimer points out, the high positive correlation between f and θ is a strong
argument in favour of a constant returns to scale matching technology.
Once ft and θt have been computed, Shimer looks at the matching func-
tion. With a Cobb-Douglas functional form, m(v,u) =  uαv1−α, two pa-
rameters need to be estimated, α and  . Using his data on ft and θt, he gets
a value of α between 0.70 and 0.75, beyond the plausible range of 0.3 to 0.5
reported by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
The separation rate is computed using another labour market ﬂows equa-
tion and results equal to 0.034. Such variable results less volatile than the
job ﬁnding rate and it presents a negative correlation with labour market
tightness.
Labour productivity is computed as the ratio between real output and
the number of workers in the non-farm business sector. Data show that
labour productivity is positive correlated with tightness and, more crucially,
its standard deviation is ten times lower than that of vacancies and almost
twenty times lower than standard deviation of labour market tightness6.
Not Shimer (2005), but some other papers I will survey later on, concen-
trate also on the volatility of the real wage with respect to productivity. In
this respect, a clear distinction has to be made. Scholars that look at time
series statistics on the aggregate wage in the economy estimate an elasticity
6of the real wage with respect to productivity, denoted by ηwp, in a range be-
tween 0.3 and 0.7 and a ratio of the standard deviations σw/σp in a interval
between 0.4 and 0.9 (Gertler and Trigari, 2006; Rotemberg, 2006; Hagedorn
and Manovskii, 2007a; 2007b)7.
Two more recents studies (Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens, 2007; Pis-
sarides, 2007), however, contend that for a correct comparison between the
data and the search and matching model is important to distinguish between
the volatility of the wages of newly hired workers and the volatility of the
wages in ongoing matches. Examining various panel regressions of individ-
ual workers (Pissarides), or using micro-data from the CPS (Haefke et al.),
both papers reach the same conclusion: the wages of newly hired workers are
as much as volatile as labour productivity (implying an unit elasticity ηwp),
whereas those in existing jobs are about half as cyclical (the same elasticity
is around 0.5 for Pissarides, 0.27 for Haefke et. al.).
2.2 Job Creation vs. Job Destruction Volatility
The strong procyclicality of the job-ﬁnding rate and the weak countercycli-
cality of the job separation rate with respect to output contradict the con-
clusions reached by Blanchard and Diamond (1989) and (1990), Davis and
Haltinwanger (1992) and Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) that con-
sider job destruction as the main source of unemployment ﬂuctuations. The
question can be put in these terms: Shimer, both in his (2005) paper and
in a subsequent one in which he uses gross ﬂow data (Shimer, 2007) argues
that recessions are essentially periods where it is extremely diﬃcult to ﬁnd
a job, whereas most of the previous literature identiﬁes recessions as periods
mainly characterized by high job loss rates. What can explain such opposite
results?
According to Shimer (2007), the reason lies on the diﬀerent facts that
he and David and Haltiwanger measure. Shimer considers the dynamic be-
haviour of monthly unemployment levels to get ft and st, whereas Davis and
Haltiwanger measure job creation and job destruction. The former is deﬁned
as the net employment gains at establishments that experience positive net
gains in a certain period; the latter as the net job losses at establishments
7experiencing negative net employment gains in a certain period. In the job
separation estimates there are computed both the ﬁrings of existing employ-
ees and the decisions of not hiring new workers that replace quitters. Firings
represent an increase in the separation rate but the decision of not hiring rep-
resents a decrease in the job-ﬁnding rate, that is therefore underestimated in
Davis and Haltiwanger’s analysis8.
Even with respect to the previous gross worker ﬂow data literature, the
divergence in the results may depend on the diﬀerent statistics measured.
Much of this literature (such as Blanchard and Diamond, 1990) refer to
the levels, that is ftut and stet, whereas Shimer’s ﬁndings are about the
rates, ft and st; ut and ft moves in opposite direction over the cycle, so that
ftut remain fairly stable even with a strongly procyclical job ﬁnding rate.
Moreover, according to Shimer the gross ﬂow literature also fails to account
for time aggregation problems. For instance, models in which workers are
not assumed to lose and ﬁnd a job within the same period (a week, or a
month) may deliver a biased measurement of the job ﬁnding rate.
Shimer’s conclusions have not put an end to the dispute. A more re-
cent strand of research (for instance, Davis, 2005; Yashiv, 2007b; Fujita and
Ramey, 2007; Elsby, Michaels, and Solon, 2007) has questioned his assertions,
arguing that the volatility of the separation rate plays a decisive contribution
to unemployment ﬂuctuations.
Since the present survey primarily concentrates on the inconsistency be-
tween matching models and data and not on the measurement of the ﬂows
in and out of unemployment, space limitations do not allow me to discuss
these papers. It is undeniable, however, that understanding the contribu-
tion of the separation rate to the unemployment variability has signiﬁcant
theoretical implications. Indeed, a separation rate strongly countercyclical
would make much less justiﬁable to consider it exogenous as in a standard
matching model. A deﬁnite word on the ins and the outs of unemployment
- if the ins win, as the “old” literature concluded, or the “outs”, as Shimer
maintains, or we have a tie, as Fujita and Ramey (2007a), Elsby, Michaels,
and Solon (2007) argue - is needed more than ever.
82.3 Policy Evaluation Estimates
The search and matching model can be quantitatively assessed also with
respect to labour market micro data. We can consider for instance the esti-
mates about the impact of the UBs both on unemployment duration and on
the level of unemployment.
Because in a standard matching model labour supply is ﬁxed and the UBs
aﬀect unemployment only via their negative impact on vacancy creation, the
studies conducted by Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) and Layard and
Nickell (1999), that evaluate the general equilibrium eﬀects of some labour
market policies in various countries, appear the most appropriate references.
They consider OECD data that go back to 1960 and get a semi-elasticity
of unemployment with respect to the UI beneﬁts replacement ratio around
1.3. Costain and Reiter (2007) also run some cross-country regressions on
the basis of Layard and Nickell’s dataset and obtain a semi-elasticity close
to 2.0. In surveying other recent estimates, Baker et al. (2003) ﬁnd values
not substantially larger than those obtained by Layard and Nickell.
2.4 Theoretical Framework
The model built up by Shimer is a standard matching framework with the
addition of a stochastic economy-wide shock in two parameters, productivity
and the separation rate. I present the case of productivity shocks, the envi-
ronment with a stochastic separation rate being symmetric. All the endoge-
nous variables that depend on the current value of productivity are henceforth
denoted by the subscript p.
The economy is composed by a measure L of risk-neutral workers. Time is
continuous and the discount rate is denoted by r. Unemployed workers search
for a job, whereas every ﬁrm can post only one vacancy. All jobs are identical
and every ﬁrm-worker pair produces the unique consumption good at the ﬂow
rate of p. Autocorrelated shocks aﬀect the value of p. More precisely, the
time sequence {pt} is a jump process with an arrival rate λ and a conditional
distribution of new values represented by the c.d.f Fp : P × P → [0,1], P
being the support of the process.
The ﬂow of new matches is denoted by m(v,u) and the job ﬁnding
9rate is given by f(θ) ≡ m(v,u)/u; the rate at which vacancies are ﬁlled
is m(v,u))/v = f(θ)/θ, positive, decreasing and convex function of θ. At
an exogenous rate a ﬁrm-worker pair is destroyed. The law of motion of
unemployment is equal to:
˙ up = s(L − up) − f(θp)up.





The downward-sloping relationship in v/u space obtained from equation 1 is
called the Beveridge curve.
Once a worker ﬁnds a ﬁrm with a vacant job, a surplus of the match arises.
It is given by the diﬀerence between the expected discounted value that the
two parties will receive by forming a match and the expected discounted
value they renounce by being employed. A zero proﬁt condition implies that
the expected discounted value of a vacancy unﬁlled is equal to zero. So, the
surplus is deﬁned as: Sp ≡ Jp + Wp − Up, in which Jp is the value of a ﬁlled
vacancy, Wp is the value of being employed for a worker, Up is the value of
unemployment. Denoting by Ep the expectation operator conditional on the
current state p, the Bellman equations take the following form:
rUp = z + f(θp)(Wp − Up) + λ(EpUp′ − Up), (2)
rWp = wp + s(Up − Wp) + λ(EpWp′ − Wp), (3)
rJp = p − wp − sJp + λ(EpJp′ − Jp), (4)
in which z denotes the instantaneous utility enjoyed by the unemployed
worker, while wp is the wage. Hence:
rSp = p − z − f(θp)(Wp − Up) − sSp + λ(EpSp′ − Sp), (5)
To determine the wage allocation, Shimer considers a Nash bargaining solu-
tion: the wage wp is chosen in order to maximize the product (Wp − Up)
β (Jp)
1−β.
Parameter β ∈ [0,1] represents workers’ bargaining power. The unique so-
lution to this maximization problem is
(1 − β) (Wp − Up) = β Jp. (6)
10Notice that Wp −Up = β Sp and Jp = (1−β)Sp. The free-entry zero proﬁt
condition implies that the expected cost of ﬁlling a vacancy (given by the
expected duration of ﬁnding a worker multiplied by the ﬂow cost of keeping





Using (2), (3), (4), (6), and (7), a standard wage equation can be derived
even in this stochastic set-up:
wp = β(p − rUp) + rUp = β (p + cθp) + (1 − β)z. (8)





(1 − β)(p − z) − βcθp + (1 − β)λEpSp′
r + s + λ
(9)
Equation (9) is the equilibrium condition for labour market tightness, with
the other endogenous variable being the expectation of future surplus EpSp′.9
2.4.1 Elasticities
In his paper, Shimer shows that the elasticity of tightness with respect to
productivity when there are no shocks, obtained by diﬀerentiating (9) with
λ = 0 , is a useful approximation of the volatility of tightness in the dynamic
stochastic set-up. Indeed, Mortensen and Nagyp´ al (2007b) prove that the
two outcomes coincide in the limit when the arrival rate λ is close to 0 or the
change in productivity is small (see Proposition 2 of their paper) 10. This
result is extremely useful, since it allows to compare diﬀerent set-ups without
the need of computing numerical simulations.






r + s + βf(θ)





where α = 1 − f′(θ)θ/f(θ) is the elasticity of the expected duration of
ﬁlling a vacancy with respect to tightness. Recalling that f(θ) =  θ1−α,
11the elasticity of the job-ﬁnding rate with respect to productivity is given by
ηf,p = (1 − α)ηθp. Using (1), I also get the elasticity of unemployment with
respect to productivity, ηu,p = (1 − α)(1 − u)ηθp.
To deal with the labour policy implications of the model and the volatility
of the wage, I compute other two related elasticities. Parameter z is the sum
of the level of unemployment beneﬁts b and the value of leisure. The semi-
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α(r + s) + f(θ)
α(r + s) + βf(θ)
 
. (12)
3 Comparing the Model with the Data
The business cycle data to which scholars have paid more attention concern
the volatility of unemployment, vacancies and the job-ﬁnding rate. The
dynamic correlation between productivity and the labour market variables,
as well as the autocorrelation of vacancies, has received less attention. Some
papers have also focused on the wage statistics. As regards the policy analysis
estimates, the performance of the model is mainly evaluated looking at the
(semi)elasticity of the unemployment with respect to the UBs.
3.1 Business Cycle Viewpoint
Shimer’s calibrated values are the following: r = 0.012, p normalized to 1,
s = 0.10, f = 1.355 (recall he obtained a monthly separation rate of 0.034
and a monthly job ﬁnding rate of 0.45), and α = 0.72. Moreover, Shimer
considers z only as the level of unemployment beneﬁts, ignoring the value
of leisure. He set it to z = 0.4. Since mean labour income in the stochastic
model is equal to 0.993, that value of z belongs to the upper end of the range
of replacement ratios in the United States.
Substituting in (10) these values and imposing the Hosios (1990) condition
β = α, that ensures the eﬃciency of the decentralized equilibrium, one gets
12Comparative Statics Model with shock on p Data
ηθp = 1.72 σθ/σp = 1.75 σθ/σp = 19.1 ρθp · σθ/σp = 7.56
- ρθp = 0.999 ρθp = 0.396
ηfp = 0.481 σf/σp = 0.5 σf/σp = 5.9 ρfp · σf/σp = 2.34
- ρfp = 0.999 ρfp = 0.396
Comparative Statics Model with shock on s Data
- ρuv = 0.999 ρuv = −0.894
Table 2. A comparison of the model with the U.S. data (period 1951-2003). Source:
Shimer (2005).
ηθp = 1.72 and ηfp = 0.481. A comparison between the the data and the
model is presented in Table 2. Assuming, as Shimer does, that shocks on
productivity are the only source of ﬂuctuations in labour market tightness, we
can compare the elasticities ηθp and ηfp with the corresponding ratios σθ/σp
and σf/σp found in the data. The diﬀerence is striking: σθ/σp is eleven times
larger that ηθp, while σf/σp is more than twelve times larger than ηfp. This
is Shimer’s main point: a standard matching model can explain less than 10
per cent of the observed ﬂuctuations in the vacancy/unemployment ratio.
The Propagation problem
The other deﬁciency of the model is the absence of propagation of the labour
productivity shock. This can be seen by comparing the contemporaneous
correlations between productivity and all the labour market variables of in-
terest. In the model, these moments are equal to 1, in the data they are close
to 0.4 in absolute value. Other shortcomings concern the autocorrelation of
vacancies and the time response of tightness to productivity. These problems
- as well as the various solutions proposed by the literature - will be discussed
in section 7.
Conditional vs. unconditional moments
Not all the papers analysing the ampliﬁcation puzzle target the ratio of stan-
dard deviations as Shimer does. The reason is explained by Mortensen and
Nagyp´ al (2007b) that argue that an empirical correlation between productiv-
ity and tightness equal to 0.396 makes questionable the assumption of pro-
ductivity as the unique explanation for tightness ﬂuctuations. Rather, such
13a value suggests the coexistence of more driving forces behind the volatility
of tightness and unemployment. Thus, instead of considering the ratios of
standard deviations, they gauge the consistency of the model by comparing
the empirical OLS regression coeﬃcients ρθp ·
σθ
σp and ρfp ·
σf
σp with the sim-
ulated ones. Data show that the latter coeﬃcient is equal to 7.56 and the
former is equal to 2.34, while the simulated counterparts are close to the
corresponding ratios of standard deviations because of the unit correlations
delivered by the model. The lack of ampliﬁcation highlighted by Shimer is
still present, but in less dramatic terms.
[ FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ]
Separation rate shock
Shimer considers also the eﬀects of a shock on the separation rate. The
main results is that it delivers a positive counterfactual correlation between
unemployment and vacancies. To understand why, consider equation (9): a
higher separation rate lowers θ, since it makes entry less proﬁtable for ﬁrms.
A decrease in labour market tightness is depicted in the v − u space by a
less steep ray starting from the origin; yet, the Beveridge curve (1) moves
to the right, so it is not possible to discern the behaviour of the vacancies
(see Figure 1). With a Cobb-Douglas matching technology, the shift of the
Beveridge curve may be large enough to make both unemployment and va-
cancies increase, explaining why in the stochastic simulation it is observed a
positive correlation between these two variables.
A framework with both productivity and separation rate shocks does not
deliver signiﬁcant improvements. Unemployment appears to be more cyclical,
but both tightness and the job ﬁnding rate are still less than 10 per cent as
volatile as expected.
Wage share and wage volatility
Two distinctive features of Shimer’s calibrated model are the large value
obtained for the wage share and the high volatility of the wage.
As regards the former, inserting the calibrated values in equation (8)
gives a wage ratio w/p = 0.973. As Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2005)
clearly show, the wage share is large in Shimer’s calibrated model because
both the job ﬁnding rate f(θ) and the workers’ bargaining power β are much
14greater than the job separation rate and the discount rate 12.
From (12), it is also clear that ηwp ≈ p/w if β is close to 1. So, in
Shimer’s calibrated model, the wage elasticity is around 1. This value is
far beyond the range of estimates obtained by examining aggregate wage
time series data, but is consistent with the results of Pissarides (2007) and
Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2007) on the volatility of wages for the
new employees. So a natural question is which of the two statistics is more
relevant to the search and matching model. Haefke et al. contend that it is
the latter. In a matching framework, ﬁrms decide to post a vacancy on the
basis of the expected present values of productivity, wages, and search costs.
Hence, the variable ηwp represents the elasticity of the expected present value
of wage payments with respect to the expected present value of productivity,
not observable in the data. Haefke et al. show that, over a plausible range of
parameters, the elasticity of the current period wage of newly hired workers
with respect to productivity is an accurate proxy for ηwp.
3.2 Policy Evaluation Viewpoint
Now I compare the semi-elasticity of unemployment with respect to b pre-
dicted by the model with its empirical counterpart. Substituting the cali-
brated values chosen by Shimer in (11), I get ζu,b = 0.45, lower than the
values reported in section 2.3.13 But the crucial point here is another. Since
p is set equal to 1, the semi-elasticity of unemployment with respect to the
unemployment beneﬁts, ζu,b is equal to the elasticity of unemployment with
respect to productivity ηu,p. Data show σu/σp = 9.5. The trade-oﬀ is clear:
either the parametrization is constructed to match the business cycle volatil-
ity of unemployment, or it is constructed to match the policy estimates cited
above. No calibration can attain both tasks.
4 First Approach: Changes in the Wage
Formation
Why is the matching model unable to replicate the observed ﬂuctuations in
unemployment and vacancies? Shimer argues that the main culprit is the
15Nash bargaining solution. “An alternative wage determination mechanism
that generates more rigid wages in new jobs, measured in present value terms,
will amplify the eﬀects of productivity shocks on the v-u ratio, helping to
reconcile theory and evidence.” (Shimer, 2005).
4.1 Exogenous Wage Rigidity
The most straightforward way to break the link between wages and produc-
tivity is to impose wage rigidity.
In this respect, an important point deserves to be stressed. Assuming
wage rigidity only in the existing matches (meaning that ﬁrms and workers
negotiate the wage only the ﬁrst time they match and then it never changes
following subsequent shocks) has no impact on the vacancy/unemployment
ratio. The reason is that this kind of rigidity does not aﬀect the discounted
expected proﬁts of the ﬁrms, but simply the timing of the wage payments.
Since in a matching model a ﬁrm decides to post a vacancy only on the basis
of its future expected proﬁts, the level of tightness takes the same value as
in the ﬂexible wage set-up.
As Shimer (2004) show, the results change dramatically in the case of rigid
wages also in new matches. Under this hypothesis, ﬁrms and workers never
bargain and take the wage as an exogenous variable. The new equilibrium




p − ¯ w
r + s
With ¯ w = 0.967 (chosen to have an average U.S. unemployment rate of
5.7), the elasticity of tightness with respect to productivity is equal to ηθp =
p/[α(p − ¯ w)] = 42.08, a value more than twice larger as the ratio of standard
deviations found in the data14.
However, the success of the rigid wage model can be questioned on dif-
ferent grounds:
1. The large values for the elasticities mainly depend on the value ¯ w =
0.967. If w = 0.5, then ηθp = 2.7, higher than in the ﬂexible wage
set-up but inconsistent with the data. Wage rigidity is not suﬃcient
16to improve the business cycle consistency of the model. A small proﬁt
share (p−w)/p is also needed, so that the percentage increase in proﬁts
is large for a given percentage increase in productivity.
2. As we have seen a the end of section 2.1, imposing wage rigidity for
new hires is not empirically grounded, Haefke et al. (2007) and Pis-
sarides (2007) having shown that the corresponding elasticity ηw,p for
this subset of wages is close to unity.
3. With perfect wage rigidity, the level of unemployment beneﬁts does
not aﬀect tightness and employment. The semi-elasticity ζub is equal
to zero. So, the price of the business cycle consistency of the model is
to make it useless for a policy evaluation analysis15.
4.1.1 Sticky wages
“Milder” forms of wage rigidity may be also introduced. Farmer and Hollen-
horst (2006) build up a fully blown DSGE model, in which households take
consumption-saving decisions and search eﬀort is endogenous, and assume
that only the 19% of the wage is bargained while the remaining fraction is
unaﬀected by productivity shocks. Even their frameworks ﬁts particularly
well U.S. data. The sticky wage economy matches the unemployment stan-
dard deviation and slightly overshoots on vacancy standard deviation. As the
authors stress, two parameters are decisive: the disutility of eﬀort parameter
and the degree of wage stickiness. The latter in particular is key in repli-
cating both a positive (negative) correlation between output and vacancies
(unemployment).
4.1.2 Staggered wage contracts
Staggered wage contracts constitute a middle way between perfectly rigid and
ﬂexible payments. Firms and workers bargain over the wage at an exogenous
Poisson rate 1−ϕ. The expected duration of a contract is therefore equal to
1/(1−ϕ). The aggregate wage in the economy is wt = (1−ϕ)w∗
t + ϕwt−1,
with w∗
t being the payment negotiated at time t. Gertler and Trigari (2006)
and Bodart, Pierrard, and Sneessens (2006) pursue this approach.
17The data Gertler and Trigari want to target are the following: σθ/σp =
12.10, σu/σp = 5.81, and σw/σp = 0.46. Assuming three or four quarters as
average length of the contract, their model explains 81% of the unemployment
volatility, 89% of tightness volatility, and 95% of wage volatility. Yet, the
success of both papers hinges on the assumption of wages stickiness also
for new matches (i.e. newly hired workers receive the same wage paid to
the other employees16), so incurring the same critique addressed to the rigid
wage hypothesis by Pissarides and Haefke et al. .
Moreover, as emphasized by Mortensen and Nagyp´ al (2007b), staggered
contracts imply that labour market tightness increases more than in the
ﬂexible set-up after a positive shock on p because only a fraction 1 − ϕ of
the new employees bargain the wage at time t. But when the wages are
ﬁnally renegotiated in accordance with the new productivity value, tightness
decreases to a level below its initial response. This is at odds with data.
4.2 Endogenous Wage Stickiness
4.2.1 Social Norm
Imposing exogenous sticky wages in the model implies that the agents are
not fully rational, since they are not exploiting all the advantages of the
negotiation. Hall (2003, 2005) overcomes this critique, by imposing a wage
norm that never lies outside the bargaining set. Adopting the same notation
used in the previous sections, worker’s reservation wage is equivalent to rU,
whereas p is the highest level of wage that an employer is willing to pay.
Suppose an idiosyncratic random shock, ǫ, normally distributed with zero
mean and standard deviation σ, that shifts the bargaining set so that it




wt = rUt + ǫ if wt−1 < rUt + ǫ
wt = pt + ǫ if wt−1 > pt + ǫ
wt = wt−1 otherwise
The wage does not change if it remains in the bargaining set, otherwise
it takes the value of the nearest boundary. Hall imposes the norm wt =
E(wt(ǫ)). The average wage at time t is a function of wt−1, rUt, and pt. It
18is worth noticing that such a norm has an impact also on the wages of new
matches, that become stickier.
Hall’s analysis diﬀer from Shimer’s one in that he considers a permanent
price shock. Productivity jumps from 1 to 1 + ∆ and then remains at that
level. His model succeeds in replicating the behaviour of key labour market
variables in the U.S. economy. A reduction in productivity by 1 per cent
produces the classical hump-shaped form for the dynamics of the unemploy-
ment rate: it starts from 5.6%, reaches the maximum value of 6.7% after
seven months, and then it starts to decline.
4.2.2 Long Term Wage Contracts
In the paper of Rudanko (2007), wage rigidity is the consequence of long
term wage contracts proposed by risk-neutral ﬁrms to risk-neutral workers in
order to smooth income in response to labour productivity shocks. Rudanko
consider three types of contracts: full commitment, where both the ﬁrm and
the employee commit not to quitting even if such choice may not be the
optimal one ex post, 1-side limited commitment, where only ﬁrms commit to
contracts, and 2-side limited commitment, in which the two parties are able
to break the contract.
The ﬁrst type of contract features perfect wage rigidity, the ﬁrm bearing
all the risk caused by ﬂuctuations in productivity. Under the second type
of contract, should a positive shock on productivity make more valuable for
the workers to quit the job, wages would adjust up to the new value of the
opportunity cost of employment to prevent it. Under 2-sided commitment,
the contract also foresees a wage decrease during troughs in order to keep
ﬁrms from ﬁring workers.
The similarity between the last contract and Hall’s model is evident.
However, the simulation results show that none of these contracts amplify
the ﬂuctuations in unemployment and vacancies17. Moreover, the ﬁrst two
types of contract feature a volatility of the aggregate wage lower than the
targeted ratio σw/σp ≈ 0.5.
The reason of this twofold failure is that the wage contracts studied by
Rudanko augment the rigidity of the wages in ongoing matches - so that the
19volatility of the aggregate wage results lower than in the data - but do not
dampen the cyclicality of the wages for new hires. Indeed, under each of
the three types of contracts, the ﬁrm makes a wage oﬀer at the moment of
the matching that depends on the present conditions in the economy. As
Rudanko observes, in her model wage rigidity fails to ﬁt both tightness and
the wage ﬂuctuations observed in the data.
4.3 Changing the bargaining threat points
A productivity shock aﬀects the wage both directly and via an increase in the
opportunity cost of employment, rU. The latter enters in the wage equation
(8) because in a standard Nash solution the threat points are constituted by
the utility for ﬁrms and workers of being unmatched (the so-called outside
options, U and V = 0 respectively for workers and ﬁrms). By changing the
threats points, Hall and Milgrom (2008) avoid that a higher opportunity cost
of employment rU translates into higher wages.
Following the non-cooperative bargaining approach of Binmore, Rubin-
stein, and Wolinsky (1986), Hall and Milgrom distinguish between outside
option and disagreement payoﬀ. The latter is what the part gets by pro-
longing the bargaining period - refusing the counterpart’s oﬀer and making a
counterproposal - and is independent on the outside conditions in the labour
market (namely, market tightness). It is assumed to be a ﬂow cost for the
ﬁrm and a ﬂow beneﬁt for the worker. So, in Hall and Milgrom’s setup the
threats points are given by a weighted average between the outside option
and the disagreement payoﬀ, the weights being respectively the exogenous
probability that the match is broken during bargaining and its complement.
Such probability is crucial in Hall and Milgrom’s analysis; the less likely
is a separation during bargaining, the weaker the impact of productivity on
the wage via U. On the other hand, if the probability is equal to 1, the
bargaining process coincides with the canonical Nash solution.
By setting the daily separation probability during the bargaining process
equal to 0.0055, Hall and Milgrom succeed in matching the U.S. data on
vacancies and unemployment ﬂuctuations18. The elasticity of the wage with
respect to productivity is equal to 0.69, a result in a middle way between
20the unit value suggested by Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2007) as a good
target for the wage elasticity in matching models and the estimates obtained
by examining aggregate wage statistics.
4.4 Asymmetric Information
As a possible solution to the poor quantitative performance of the matching
model, Shimer (2005) also suggests the introduction of asymmetric infor-
mation in the wage process. The results summarized in this section show
that asymmetric information is not suﬃcient per se; in order to augment
the volatility in the model, the amount of private information hold by the
employer must be also increasing in booms.
4.4.1 Acyclical informational rents
Br¨ ugemann and Moscarini (2007) explain the limited impact of asymmetric
information on amplifying ﬂuctuations by examining the properties of the
wage equation. When the matching between a worker and a ﬁrm gives rise
to quasi-rents, the wage can be divided in two parts: a fraction of the total
rent generated by the match and the opportunity cost of employment, that
is always procyclical. For instance, in the Nash solution, the former is given
by β (p − rU) and the latter by rU.
Br¨ ugemann and Moscarini ﬁrst show that in many models with asymmet-
ric information in the bargaining process workers’ rents are at most acyclical,
but never countercyclical. Then they prove that an acyclical worker’s rent is
not suﬃcient to generate the observed business cycle ﬂuctuations19. In their
baseline framework, the output of an employer-worker match is the sum of
an aggregate productivity component and a match-speciﬁc one, the latter be-
ing private information of the employer. Similarly, a match speciﬁc amenity
value of the job, known only by the worker, adds to the wage to determine
his utility in employment. Nesting in such set-up three diﬀerent wage de-
termination schemes (a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, a sequential bargaining with
one-sided asymmetric information, and a bilateral asymmetric information
scheme), they show that none of these set-ups is able to amplify unemploy-
ment and vacancy ﬂuctuations.
21Their conclusion is corroborated by the results of Guerrieri (2007). She
constructs a competitive search model in which workers privately observe
their type20. Her numerical exercises show that asymmetric information does
not help in replicating the ampliﬁcation in vacancy and unemployment ob-
served in the data.
4.4.2 Procyclical informational rents
Br¨ ugemann and Moscarini analyse a symmetric set-up, in which both the
employer and the employee hide some information to the counterpart and
the outside economic conditions do not aﬀect such informational rents. Two
papers show that the performance of the model is bettered if it is assumed
that the gain that ﬁrms obtain by being more informed than workers is
increasing in booms.
Kennan (2007) develops this idea by considering two aggregate states
in the economy (1, the bad state and 2, the good state) and two diﬀerent
idiosyncratic values for the productivity of a job (high or low). After matched
with a worker, only the ﬁrm knows the idiosyncratic value of a job. So, if the
ﬁrm makes the oﬀer, it will get all the surplus and the worker will receive his
opportunity cost of employment. On the other hand, if the worker makes the
oﬀer, he faces a potential trade-oﬀ between demanding a higher wage and
being sure to reach an agreement. Kennan imposes two crucial assumptions:
1) workers always demand the low surplus; 2) when the aggregate state of the
economy is good, there are more jobs with high idiosyncratic productivity.
Given these two assumptions, an average ﬁrm will earn more proﬁts dur-
ing booms also because the higher idiosyncratic value of the match does not
translate into higher wages. Kennan shows that such procyclical informa-
tional rent enjoyed by the ﬁrm magnify the ﬂuctuations in unemployment
and vacancies21.
A similar approach is pursued by Menzio (2005) in a wage-posting model
with intra-ﬁrm bargaining. Firms have private information about their pro-
ductivity type (composed by a permanent and a transitory part) and every
period advance a wage oﬀer both to its employees and to the fraction of un-
employed workers contacted. Once the worker has observed all the oﬀers re-
22ceived, he chooses a trading partner and the ﬁrm-worker negotiation begins.
In the stable equilibrium of the extensive form bargaining game, identical
workers employed in the same ﬁrm cannot be payed diﬀerently; otherwise, a
discriminated worker could ask for a renegotiation of his payment conditions.
Because of this non-discrimination constraint, the cost for a ﬁrm willing to
adjust his wage bill in response to positive productivity shock is proportional
to the measure of its employees. On the other hand, the beneﬁt of raising
the wage is given by a higher acceptance rate of contacted workers and a
lower separation rate of the employees searching on-the-job. The shorter the
expected duration of the shock, the smaller will be the marginal beneﬁt of
raising the wage. So, the wage is independent of the realization of productiv-
ity shocks if its persistence is below a certain threshold. This kind of wage
rigidity, together with a low calibrated proﬁt share, ampliﬁes the volatility
of unemployment and vacancies ﬂuctuations (Menzio’s numerical results are
σv/σp = 7.83 and σv/σp = 6.45)22.
4.5 Final remarks on the ﬁrst approach
It is undeniable that the wage ﬂexibility implied by the Nash solution plays
a role in weakening the volatility of unemployment and vacancies in response
to a productivity shock. However, Shimer (2005) and the subsequent liter-
ature summarized in this section have probably put too much emphasis on
that aspect. Indeed, loosening or even breaking the link between wages and
productivity in the model is not per se suﬃcient to replicate business cycle
facts. A low proﬁt share is also needed. In addition, the critique raised by
Pissarides and Haefke, Sonntag and van Rens concern all the sticky wages
model presented din this section barring Hall and Milgrom (2008).
Models with asymmetric information deliver conﬂicting results. The busi-
ness cycle consistency of the model is improved only by imposing procyclical
information rents. Such assumption is however diﬃcult to test empirically.
235 Second Approach: Changes in the
Calibration
The papers examined so far are based on the belief that Shimer is right both
when he denounces the quantitative inconsistency of a standard matching
model and when he identiﬁes the Nash wage bargain as the main culprit.
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2007a) take a diﬀerent route and focus on the
calibration of the model.
Their model is substantially similar to the one presented in section 2.4, the
only diﬀerence being the introduction of capital in the production technology
in order to measure the capital cost of vacancy creation. Some calibrated
values are the same as in Shimer’s paper: r = 0.012, f = 1.355, and
s = 0.10. Mean labour productivity is normalized to 1.
Hagedorn and Manovskii’s calibration method essentially diﬀers in com-
puting β and z.23 To pin down these two variables and the matching function
parameter, they use as targets f = 1.35, θ = 0.634 (obtained by choosing a
quarterly job ﬁlling rate f/θ = 2.13), and, more importantly, the elasticity
ηw,p = 0.449. They obtain z = 0.955, β = 0.052, in a striking contrast
with the values chosen by Shimer (z = 0.4 and β = α = 0.72). Hagedorn
and Manovskii claim that such a discrepancy can be explained by focusing
on two aspects: 1) In the model, the proﬁt share (p − w)/p is small and 2)
The wages are moderately procyclical in the data.
The ﬁrst fact has been already emphasized in the previous sections. A
low proﬁt share is necessary (but not suﬃcient) to amplify the business cy-
cle ﬂuctuations in unemployment and vacancies. As noticed in section 3.1,
Shimer obtains a large value for w/p because he sets β = 0.72, so βf(θ)
is large relative to s and r. But we can have a high labour share also by











r + s + βf(θ)
(13)
The labour share is close to one if the term inside the square brackets is close
to one. This can be obtained either with a large β, or with a high fraction
z/p. But a high β implies an elasticity ηwp close to unity (see equation
2412). Since Hagedorn and Manovskii target ηwp = 0.449, they opt for a high
fraction z/p and a low β.24
Hagedorn and Manovskii show that their results are not sensitive to the
kind of matching technology assumed. So, keeping the usual Cobb-Douglas
matching function with α = 0.72, one gets the following elasticities values:
ηθp = 26.8 and ηfp = 7.5. Compared to the results presented in Table
2, Hagedorn and Manovski’s calibrated model succeeds in amplifying the
ﬂuctuations in tightness and in unemployment. The reason stems from the
high value of z, that raises the values of the elasticities ηθp and ηfp.
5.1 Pros and cons of the second approach
The parametrization performed by Hagedorn and Manovskii can be ques-
tioned on three diﬀerent grounds.
First, with z = 0.955 the gap between the utility of being employed and
the utility of being unemployed becomes extremely small (the diﬀerence w−z
is only 0.022). Is it realistic to think that employees work for a 2.2% surplus?
Hagedorn and Manovskii list a series of reason in favour of a high z. They
claim for instance that since in the model the expected duration of ﬁnding
a work is low, it is plausible to imagine that for people remaining without
a job for 2.5 months on average the utility gap is almost zero. Further, a
standard RBC set-up with indivisibility of labour and without search frictions
would imply a diﬀerence w−z equal to zero, so their calibrated model can be
viewed as a linear approximation of a richer framework in which workers take
consumption-saving decisions and ﬁrms face a downward-sloping demand.
Second, targeting an elasticity ηwp = 0.449 is in contrast with the conclu-
sions of Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2007) that consider the elasticity of
the wage for the new matches (close to unity, according to their estimates) as
a correct approximation in a canonical matching model with Nash bargain.
Third, using Hagedorn and Manovskii’s calibration, one gets ζub = 6.96,
three times larger than the value reported in section 2.3. This conﬁrms the
existence of a business cycle / policy analysis trade-oﬀ25.
256 Third approach: Enriching the Standard
Model
Papers following the third approach agree with Shimer’s diagnosis about the
business cycle inconsistency of a standard matching model, but doubt that
the Nash wage bargain is the main culprit for the quantitative failings of
the model. The underlying motivation of these papers is that a text-book
matching model is a useful tool to look at the qualitative eﬀects of a policy
change or a shock, but it is too stylized to be also consistent with data.
Therefore, embedding in the standard setting other realistic features like
on-the-job search, hiring and ﬁring costs, imperfectly competitive product
markets, ﬁrms heterogeneity, should make the model more suitable for a
quantitative scrutiny.
6.1 Turnover costs
Silva and Toledo (2007) insert two diﬀerent kinds of turnover costs in a
standard matching model: training costs that ﬁrms spend for new entrants
and separation costs suﬀered by employers when a job is destroyed.
Both the model and their calibration do not stray too much from Shimer
(2005). It is worth stressing that they set β = 0.34 and z = 0.715 in
order to obtain ζub equal to 2.0, in line with the policy evaluation estimates
presented in section 2.3 and so avoiding the criticisms addressed to Hagedorn
and Manovskii’s (2007a) setup.
Inserting Silva and Toledo’s calibrated values in their equations for the
elasticities, one gets: ηθp = 6.62, almost four times larger than in Shimer’s
setting, ηfp = 1.85, ηu,p = 1.747, and ηw,p = 1. Recall that in U.S. data,
σf/σp = 5.9 and σu/σp = 9.5, while Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2007)
suggest that a unit wage elasticity is a good proxy in a standard matching
framework. Silva and Toledo’s paper improves upon the business cycle con-
sistency of the model while keeping it consistent with the microeconometric
estimates presented in section 2.3.26
Why do turnover costs better the performance of the model? The mech-
anism is analogous to that obtained by a low proﬁt share. Turnover costs
26lower the value of a ﬁlled job, so a higher p yields a large percentage in-
crease in proﬁts. More vacancies are posted in order to restore the free-entry
equilibrium, enhancing the tightness elasticity.
A similar eﬀect is present in Garibaldi (2006). He considers two types of
large (multiple jobs) ﬁrms in his model: those that, having a high produc-
tivity value, react to adverse shocks by simply posting less vacancies, and
those “at the margin”, with a very low proﬁt share. When a productivity
shock hits the economy, this second kind of ﬁrms either declares bankruptcy,
ﬁring all the employees, or freezes its hirings, not replacing the workers who
quit. If the expected losses are greater in absolute value than ﬁring costs,
the ﬁrm declares bankruptcy, otherwise it experiences a “hiring freeze”. For
ﬁrms “at the margin” a small change in productivity can make a great dif-
ference, and the number of vacancies they post in good times is much higher
than the number of vacancies (not) posted in bad times. The volatility of
such variable greatly increases. Accounting for hiring freeze and bankruptcy
allows Garibaldi to explain up to 35% of the tightness volatitly displayed in
the data.
6.2 On-the-job search
6.2.1 Hiring costs and on-the-job search
Nagyp´ al (2005) shows that a combination of hiring costs and on-the-job
search may reconcile the model with the empirical evidence.
In her set-up, ﬁrms incur hiring costs - i.e. they pay a ﬁxed amount of
resources upon the matching - and employees search for jobs with a higher
idiosyncratic payoﬀ. Hence, some matches have a negative pay-oﬀ for ﬁrms,
for an employee working in a job with a low idiosyncratic payoﬀ can quit be-
fore the employer has recouped his initial investment. Firms do not know the
idiosyncratic value of the match, but they realize that unemployed searchers
are more likely to accept matches with a low match quality than employed
searchers. This is due to a positive selection eﬀect that shifts workers into
match qualities towards the top of the distribution. So, with high hiring costs
ﬁrms have a lower expected pay-oﬀ from contacting an unemployed searcher
than an employed one. After a positive shock on p, the fraction of employed
27searchers out of the total number of searchers increases, making ﬁrms even
more willing to post vacancies.
Nagyp´ als compute the elasticity of the job ﬁnding rate in response to a
positive shock on productivity and a negative one on the separation rate, in
order to amplify the eﬀects in terms of vacancy creation. If hiring costs are
imposed to be 2 or 3 times the quarterly proﬁt ﬂow p−w this implies a σf/σp
respectively of 3.086 and 7.168, close to the value of 5.9 found by Shimer in
the data.
6.2.2 Wage heterogeneity
An increase in the number of job-seekers in response to a positive shock on
productivity may enhance the volatility of vacancies and unemployment in
the model, because it increases the job ﬁlling rate, boosting vacancy creation.
This is the mechanism at work in the paper of Krause and Lubik (2006).
They consider an economy with an high-paid sector and a low-paid one. The
employees that work in the low-paid sector exert some eﬀort on searching
on-the-job. Following an economy-wide positive productivity shock, ﬁrms
post more vacancies both in the high-paid and in the low-paid sector. A
higher tightness in the high-paid sector raises the search eﬀort of the low-
paid employees, implying a higher number of job seekers in terms search
units. The rate at which a high-paid job is ﬁlled goes up, so making ﬁrms
even more willing to post vacancies there. The process ends because of a
convexity assumption of the search cost, delivering a larger ampliﬁcation in
vacancy posting in response to a productivity shock. A complementarity
between sectors also arises. If search eﬀort of low-paid employees goes up,
congestion eﬀects in the matching technology will make more diﬃcult for
unemployed workers to ﬁnd a high-paid job. Then, they will direct their
search toward the low-paid sector. This in turn will boost vacancy creation
in that sector. The model succeeds in replicating almost the 90% of tightness
ﬂuctuations but it predicts a too small wage volatility (σw/σp = 0.117).
286.3 Embodied Technical Change
Shimer assumes that the productivity shock hits in the same way all the
matches in the economy. Costain and Reiter (2007) and Reiter (2007) argue
that a model with embodied technical change helps to solve the ampliﬁcation
puzzle. In their model, the productivity of a match is denoted by Y and takes
the following form:
Y = (1 − ξp) · p + ξp · pm, 0 ≤ ξp ≤ 1
in which p is the current level of productivity and pm is the level of aggregate
productivity at the time the match was formed. The higher the value of
the parameter ξp, the more embodied in the match is the technical change.
When ξp = 0, the model is identical to the standard one studied in section
2.4.
Why should embodied technical change amplify ﬂuctuations? The reason
is twofold. First, if the observed productivity is an average of past vintages,
then the productivity for new matches, that is the source of unemployment
and vacancies ﬂuctuations, results underestimated. The calibrated model
must therefore account for a higher variability of current productivity.
Second, embodied technical change makes employers’s surplus more pro-
cyclical. The productivity of a match is only partially aﬀected by current
shocks. Anticipating that, ﬁrms will post many vacancies when the shock
is positive. Fluctuations in vacancies and unemployment are bigger as in
the disembodied productivity case. With ξp = 0.302 or ξp = 0.576, Reiter
(2007) gets a ratio σθ/σp equal respectively to 7.9 or 18.65, while the same
set-up with ξp = 0, delivers a relative standard deviation equal to 4.15.
Costain and Reiter (2007) highlight two shortcomings of the model. First,
endogenous separation rate should be taken into account, because workers
could ﬁnd optimal to quit their job when new matches with higher productiv-
ity are created in the economy. This kind of separations raises the number of
unemployed people in upturns, destroying the Beveridge curve. The second
shortcoming concerns the excessive wage volatility delivered by the model27.
To overcome these problems, Reiter (2007) introduces two features: a
long-term wage contract ` a la Rudanko (2007) and turnover costs ` a la Silva
and Toledo (2007). The former reduces the wage volatility, while post-match
29training costs paid by the workers make more costly for them to quit a job
and search for another opportunity. Reiter’s results seem to go in the right
direction.28
6.4 The role of the separation rate
What is the role of the separation rate in amplifying unemployment and
vacancies ﬂuctuations? Several scholars have addressed this question. To
clarify their conclusions, it is important to distinguish between models that
consider an exogenous separation rate and models in which it is endogenous.
In the former case, the idea consists on incorporating a countercycli-
cal shock on the separation rate to the standard model with a productivity
shock. Recall from section 3.1 that Shimer (2005) has already performed
such exercise, reaching ambiguous results. Fluctuations in unemployment
are ampliﬁed, because the level of this variable along the cycle is aﬀected not
only by procyclical job creation but also by countercyclical separation rates.
The problems concern the behaviour of the vacancies. An increase in the
separation rate has two eﬀects opposite in sign. On one hand, it raises the
factor to which proﬁts are discounted, stiﬂing vacancy creation (job creation
eﬀect). On the other hand, it shifts the Beveridge curve to the right, so more
vacancies must be posted for the equality of labour market ﬂows to hold; this
is obtained by an increase in the job ﬁlling rate f(θ)/θ that induces more
ﬁrms to enter the market (Beveridge curve eﬀect). As a result, a positive
shock on the separation rate may deliver a counterfactual increase in vacan-
cies. Figure 1 illustrates the two mechanisms at work. The ﬂuctuations in
tightness and the job ﬁnding rate, that are bigger the more procyclical is the
level of vacancies, remain insuﬃciently low.
Such discouraging conclusions are in part reversed by Mortensen and
Nagyp´ al (2007b). Mortensen and Nagyp´ al show that the counterfactual in-
crease in vacancies during troughs may be ruled out once a wage bargaining
` a la Hall and Milgrom (2008) is introduced in the model. Loosening the link
between wage and tightness ampliﬁes the negative eﬀect of the separation
rate on vacancy creation, for the decrease in expected proﬁts is not oﬀset by
a lower wage. So, the equality of labour market ﬂows is reached at a level
30of vacancies lower than before. In terms of Figure 1, the job creation 0-ray
shifts down more than under the canonical Nash solution.29.
More recent papers have sought to answer Shimer’s puzzle by introduc-
ing endogenous separation rates. Despite its theoretical appeal, such a try
does not seem to reach satisfactory results. Either analysing the standard
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model (Pissarides, 2007) or considering an
extended version of it (Mortensen and Nagyp´ al, 2007a), the conclusions are
similar: endogenous separations have a scarce impact on job creation and the
volatility of tightness. The reason is well explained by Pissarides. When the
separation rate is exogenous, all jobs are equally likely to be destroyed. Job
creation is dampened because a positive shock on s reduces the expected prof-
its of any match, regardless of their productivity value. When the separation
rate is endogenous, only matches with a value close to the reservation produc-
tivity are destroyed. Job creation is scarcely aﬀected because the expected
returns of such jobs is close to zero and ﬁrms and workers are indiﬀerent in
continuing the match or separating.
Elsby and Michaels and Andr´ es, Dom´ enech, and Ferri (2006) are able to
match the data in a model with endogenous separations, but their models
present several mechanisms that may potentially amplify vacancy ﬂuctua-
tions. In Elsby and Michaels’s paper, it is key the assumption of decreasing
marginal productivity and intra-ﬁrm bargaining. Firms hire more than one
worker and, under Nash bargaining, the wage is a constant fraction of ﬁrms’
marginal revenues. The employers take into account the marginal decrease
in the wage bill caused by hiring one additional worker, so, ceteris paribus,
they will post more vacancies than in the standard linear case.30 The in-
crease in job creation caused by a positive shock on productivity outweighs
the Beveridge curve eﬀect, and vacancies are strongly procyclical.
6.5 Price rigidity
Andr´ es, Dom´ enech, and Ferri (2006) construct a DSGE model in which sev-
eral mechanisms aﬀect vacancy behaviour: endogenous separation rates, cap-
ital, taxes, intertemporal substitution, and price rigidity. The latter gives the
most decisive contribution in terms of tightness ampliﬁcation.
31Their model features a two-tier productive scheme: wholesale ﬁrms op-
erate in a competitive market using labour and capital. Retail ﬁrms adopt
as only input the good bought by wholesale ﬁrms and are monopolistically
competitive. The ﬁnal consumption good is a composite of diﬀerent vari-
eties produced in the retail sectors. As for the wage contracts in Gertler and
Trigari (2006), the price decisions of the retail ﬁrms are staggered over time.
When a positive shock aﬀects the productivity of the wholesale ﬁrms, the
relative price of their good immediately go down, due to the price rigidities
in the retail sector. Yet, it soars in the following periods because of the
downward adjustments of the prices in the retail sectors. Such a jump is less
smooth than in the case of ﬂexible prices, so that the value of match for the
wholesale ﬁrms varies more and vacancy creation is boosted.
6.6 Other sources of shocks
If changes in labour productivity are tiny in comparison with the variations
in unemployment and vacancies, maybe it is because the former is not the
(only) exogenous driving force in the economy. As a result, the failure of the
model does not depend on the lack of an ampliﬁcation mechanism, but on
the misidentiﬁcation of the correct shock hitting the economy.
Such a reading of the Shimer puzzle is gaining the attention of several
scholars. The papers following this route present a rich framework that en-
compasses several departures from the standard search and matching model.
While the results in terms of ampliﬁcations and propagation mechanism are
often promising, it is diﬃcult to disentangle all the eﬀects at work in these
set-ups.
6.6.1 A VAR approach
Yashiv (2005; 2006) considers a reduced-form VAR of the actual data to spec-
ify the driving shocks. Assuming that three variables (the rate of productivity
growth, the separation rate, and the interest rate) follow a ﬁrst-order VAR,
his model captures the persistence, the volatility and some co-movements
of the main labour market variable in the data. The high persistence of
vacancies is obtained by imposing convex hiring costs that make vacancy
32creation more sluggish. Yet, convex costs also tend to reduce the volatility
of the vacancies. To amplify ﬂuctuations, according to Yashiv, the stochas-
tic properties of the separation rate play a crucial role. He rightly argues
that the separation rate is key in evaluating the expected discounted value
of a match. Nevertheless, it is not clear why in Yashiv’s VAR approach it
is so essential in engendering the correct volatility, while Shimer’s setting
with contemporaneous shocks both in p and in s does not deliver analogous
outcomes.
6.6.2 Market power
While in Shimer’s model a technological shock hits all the jobs, Rotemberg
(2006) considers a change in ﬁrms’ market power as driving force in the
economy. The key is that in the former set-up the marginal productivity of
labour and, in turn, the wage increase. In the latter, ﬁrms react to ﬁercer
competition by producing more, and labour productivity goes down. Workers
have to moderate their wage demand, while employment goes up31.
Rotemberg’s main objective is to match data on wage volatility. In his
model σw/σp = 0.56, a value that ﬁts the data on the aggregate wage tar-
geted by the author, but that is inconsistent with the conclusions of Haefke et
al. (2007) about a unit wage elasticity (so, an even higher ratio of standard
deviations) as the right target in a matching model with Nash bargaining.
Further, the model overshoots on vacancies volatility, whereas it captures one
third of the employment ﬂuctuations and half of unemployment volatility.
However, as Trigari (2006) documents in a detailed comment, the success
of the paper depends less on the imperfect competition, and diminishing
returns of labour than on the high value assigned to the instantaneous utility
in unemployment (Rotemberg sets z/w = 0.9), conﬁrming once again the
importance of a low proﬁt share in order to amplify ﬂuctuations.
6.6.3 Establishment level shocks
Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis (2007) build up a matching model with an
establishment level proﬁtability shocks and succeed in ﬁtting cyclical the be-
haviour of unemployment, vacancies and wages. In their framework, ﬁrms
33can adjust both the intensive and the extensive margin (hours worked and
level of employment), have all the bargaining power in the wage negotia-
tion, and face ﬁxed and variable costs when hiring or ﬁring workers. Firms’
production function is subject both to aggregate and idiosyncratic (estab-
lishment levels) shocks. The objective of their paper is not only to solve
Shimer’s puzzle but also to match some establishment observations, such as
the negative correlation between hours growth and employment growth. It is
diﬃcult to isolate all the eﬀects that are at work in such a rich setting. The
authors argue that their set-up is able to ﬁt the aggregate data partly because
of the distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks that are not smoothed out by
aggregation, while another potentially interesting feature of the model - the
possibility for ﬁrms to ﬁre workers as in Garibaldi (2006) - is unexplained.
6.6.4 Monetary shocks
A recent strand of the literature has investigated the contribution of demand
(monetary and not monetary) shocks to the labour market. In this respect,
these papers belong to the vein of the new-Keynesian models, in which several
departures from a standard RBC framework contribute to the response of the
labour market variables.
The paper that most convincingly stresses the importance of monetary
shocks in order to understand the Shimer puzzle is Barnichon (2007). He
argues that the cyclical changes in labour productivity, considered by Shimer
as the only determinant of unemployment and tightness ﬂuctuations, are
actually caused by exogenous shocks on monetary policy. Productivity and
tightness comove in response to the same shock, but there is not causal
relationship between the former and the latter. In his model a shock that
increases the supply of money is able to explain about 50% of the tightness
volatility.
Braun (2005)’s model presents many features that may potentially am-
plify the eﬀects of a monetary policy shocks: wage stickiness, price rigidity in
the intermediate sectors, a high opportunity cost of employment, and train-
ing costs. After having estimated an identiﬁed VAR on US data, he ﬁnds
that wage rigidity and a high opportunity cost of employment contribute
34more decisively in matching the empirical responses.
Braun, de Bock, and Di Cecio (2007) also adopt a VAR approach to ask
which shock is the most crucial in driving labour market ﬂuctuations. They
identify three kinds of shocks: supply shocks, that are required to have oppo-
site eﬀects on output and the price level, demand shocks, that move output
and prices in the same direction, and monetary shocks, that also push down
the interest rate. Their conclusion is that, although the response of hours
worker, unemployment, and vacancies is qualitatively the same regardless
of the shock considered, demand shocks may be more important in driving
labour market ﬂuctuations.
7 The Propagation of Shocks
A standard matching model not only falls short of replicating labour market
ﬂuctuations but also exhibits no propagation of productivity shocks. Three
facts are worth stressing: 1) Data show that the maximum correlation be-
tween vacancies and current productivity is observed when vacancies are one
or two quarters ahead, while in the model the peak is reached at zero lags.
2) In the data, labour market tightness follows productivity by one year and
the contemporaneous correlation between these two variables is 0.40. Simu-
lation results, on the contrary, predicts a correlation ρθp equal to 0.999 . The
correlation between productivity and the other labour market variables are
also greatly overshooted. 3) The autocorrelation of vacancies is lower in the
model than in the data.
The absence of propagation in a matching model depends on how vacancy
behaviour is modeled. As Pissarides (2000, p.26-31) stresses, vacancies - and
consequently market tightness - are a “jump variable”, so they adjust too
rapidly in response to a productivity shock. Thus, any mechanism allowing
for a more sluggish vacancy behaviour should yield a more realistic dynamics.
Fujita (2003), Fujita and Ramey (2007b), and Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2007b) address this issue. Hagedorn and Manovskii introduce time to build
in job creation. Any vacancy created at a certain moment enters the market
with some delay. Their model can match the contemporaneous correlation
of tightness and productivity, but still fails to account for the correct auto-
35correlation of vacancies.
In the model of Fujita and Ramey (2007b), a ﬁrm-pair can be destroyed
for two reasons: obsolescence, meaning that the worker becomes unemployed
and the position disappears, or “normal” separation, meaning that both the
worker and the job position enters the matching pool the following period.
Moreover, the zero proﬁt equilibrium equation is assumed to be equal to
Vt = K · nt . The value of a vacancy at time t is equal to a sunk cost, that
Fujita and Ramey assume increasing in the number of positions created in
the economy at t, nt. These changes has two eﬀects.
First, marginal costs that increase with the number of positions induce
ﬁrms to spread out vacancy creation. In turn, this translates into a more
realistic value for the autocorrelation of vacancies, like in the Yashiv (2006)
framework with convex hiring costs. Second, since the value of a vacancy
is strictly positive at the equilibrium, ﬁrms are willing to keep a position
open after a separation. Vacancies become a predetermined variable. Dif-
ferently from Shimer (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2007b), Fujita
and Ramey ﬁrst estimate a reduced-form VAR to study the dynamics of em-
ployment, tightness and productivity. Then they compare their simulation
results with conditional empirical correlations. Their model delivers a more
realistic propagation mechanism, both in terms of cross correlations and in
terms of impulse response.
8 Concluding Remarks
Shimer (2005) and Costain and Reiter (2007) have called in question the
quantitative consistency of the matching models. Considering the relative
short period of time elapsed from the publications of these papers, many
scholars have reacted to their ﬁndings, and with competing approaches.
Shimer’s results concern the inability of the model to reproduce realistic
ﬂuctuations and propagations of shocks. As far as the propagation problem is
concerned, Fujita and Ramey (2007b) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2007b)
are able to ameliorate the dynamics of the model by making vacancies re-
sponse more sluggish.
As regards the ampliﬁcation puzzle, scholars have followed three diﬀerent
36routes, that Table 4 summarizes. Unfortunately, it is not possible to adopt
a unique criterion in evaluating all the papers: some of them ignore policy
analysis issues, others do not report statistics on the real wage, some others
present their ﬁndings in terms of impulse response functions and not in terms
of elasticities or relative standard deviations. Table 4 therefore can give only
an idea of the results presented in the previous sections.
However, the general conclusion that may be drawn is that the third
approach appears the most eﬀective. A model with turnover costs improve
the business cycle ﬂuctuations and ﬁt the policy analysis long-run estimates.
Cohort-speciﬁc shocks on productivity match data quite well and are em-
pirically plausible. The combination of hiring costs and on-the-job search
betters the performance of the matching model also in response to shocks on
the separation-rate.
Nevertheless, some questions remain open. To which extent is job sepa-
ration important in explaining unemployment ﬂuctuations? Can a standard
matching model match business cycle facts in other countries, in Europe for
instance? The macroeconomic performance of matching models is far from
being an exhausted research area.
37Figure 1: The Ampliﬁcation Puzzle
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Notes
1Pioneered by Diamond, Mortensen, and Pissarides. See Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999) and Pissarides (2000) for a detailed exposition.
2This point has been ﬁrst spelled out by Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2005) and
Mortensen and Nagyp´ al (2007b).
3The same space limitations do not allow me to review some recent DSGE matching
models that bear some relationship with the issues raised in this survey, but whose main
scope is not to react to Shimer’s ﬁndings. For instance, Blanchard and Gali (2005) and
Walsh (2005) are more oriented on monetary issues, while Veracierto (2002) focuses on
the dynamic behaviour of labour force participation.
4Statistics on unemployment are constructed by the BLS from the Current Population
Survey (CPS), while measures on job vacancies are proxied using the the Conference Board
help-wanted index, that computes the number of help-wanted advertisements in 51 major
newspapers. The Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) would the ideal
source for an analysis of job vacancies, but it collects data only from December 2000.
However, a comparison of the two measures from 2000 to 2003 shows that the Conference
Board help-wanted index does not diﬀer substantially from the JOLTS.
5To measure the job-ﬁnding rate, Shimer prefers not to use gross worker ﬂow data, for
the dataset is available only since 1976 and measurement and classiﬁcation errors could
bias his estimation. Instead, he constructs it by using the monthly number of unemployed
people and assuming that workers are homogeneous and neither enter nor exit the labour
force. In a subsequent paper, he shows that relaxing such strong assumption does not bias
his computations (see Shimer, 2007).
6Hagedorn and Manovskii (2007b) have recently pointed out that the results concerning
the correlation between productivity and market tightness are strikingly diﬀerent depend-
ing on using CPS data or the Current Employment Statistics. The reason has still to be
ascertained. The papers I will survey in the following sections have followed Shimer (2005)
and considered the CES data.
7Since the variables are expressed in log, OLS estimation tells us that ηwp = ρwp ·
σw/σp.
8Moreover, Davis and Haltiwanger consider only manufacturing establishments in which
job separation is more volatile than in the rest of the economy.
9 Mortensen and Nagyp´ al (2007b) prove that under some conditions, an equilibrium
solution deﬁned as a vector of functions (wp, θp, Up, Wp, Jp, Sp ) for any possible value
of productivity p exists, is unique, and all the functions are increasing in p. For the proof,
I refer to them.
10 Shimer sets λ = 4, a relatively large value, but also imposes ∆ equal to 0.0083, so
the approximation can be accepted.
3911I compute the semi-elasticity of u with respect to b and not the elasticity simply to
follow Costain and Reiter (2007) and compare more easily the results of the model with
the estimates presented in section 2.3.
12 The wage share is equal to w
p = β + β cθ
p + (1 − β)z
p. Hornstein, Krusell, and











13Actually, Layard and Nickell consider the semi-elasticity of unemployment with respect
to the replacement ratio. So one would have b = υ·w with υ being the replacement ratio.
However, in the present calibration, w ≈ p = 1. So ζu,b ≈ ζu,υ.
14Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2005) show that when wages are rigid the compar-
ative statics elasticity ηθp overestimates the response of θ to a productivity shock. For
simplicity, I still compute ηθp, considering it as an upper-bound for volatility. Shimer
(2004) sets α = 0.5. In this case, ηθp = 60.6.
15Another shortcoming of the rigid wage model is the lack of persistence in vacancies:
their autocorrelation is 0.715, while in the data it is 0.930. I will discuss this issue in
section 7.
16This is what Gertler and Trigari assume. Bodart, Pierrard, and Sneessens impose
that a fraction of new jobs can have a freely negotiated wage but their sensitivity analysis
shows that such a fraction must be close to 0 in order to have realistic unemployment
ﬂuctuations.
17Actually, the model gets close to the data only by setting the instantaneous utility
of unemployment z higher than 0.8. This conﬁrms again the crucial role played by a low
proﬁt share.
18Following Mortensen and Nagyp´ al (2007b), they disentangle the part of volatility
captured by ﬂuctuations in productivity from that beyond the reach of a productivity
explanation.
19 The rationale behind this point goes as follows. If worker’s fraction of the total rent
is rigid and large, this implies that the capital gain from ﬁnding a job is also high. Data
show that f(θ) is extremely volatile and procyclical. But a high job ﬁnding rate and a
large capital gain in booms will enhance the opportunity cost of employment that, in turn,
will generate strongly procyclical wages, so dampening the incentives on vacancy creation
during booms. Br¨ ugemann and Moscarini call such mechanism the feedback eﬀect. On
the other hand, if the rent accruing to the worker is low and acyclical, the same problem
analyzed in the rigid wage model occurs. A lower rent going to the employee means large
proﬁts for the ﬁrm, so that a percentage increase in productivity will enhance them only
by a small percentage amount. Firms will not open many vacancies in booms. This
second mechanism is called by the authors the congestion eﬀect, because it depends on
the free-entry condition that links directly the number of vacancies posted with ﬁrms’
proﬁts. Both the congestion eﬀect and the feedback eﬀect limit the response of tightness
to a productivity shock.
20Workers are heterogeneous in terms of sunk, training, costs they incur at the beginning
of their employment spell.
21Kennan compares the steady-state rate of unemployment both in the bad and in
the good state of the economy (denoted respectively, u1 and u2) with the corresponding
values obtained in a model without asymmetric information. The informational rent moves
unemployment by about 40%, even though the diﬀerence in productivity levels is only 3%:
u1 = 5.6% and u2 = 5.5% in the case of complete information, whereas u1 = 7.5% and
u2 = 5.2% when productivity is observed privately by the employer.
4022Menzio also introduces concave vacancy costs. This assumption can by itself magnify
the volatility of vacancies.
23A part from the values of β and z, other departures from Shimer’s calibration are: i) a
diﬀerent matching function: m(u,v) = u·v/
 
ul + vl 1/l
, with l being the only parameter
to be estimated; ii) a quarterly job ﬁlling rate f/θ = 2.13, so that θ = 0.634; iii) the total
ﬂow cost of opening a vacancy deﬁned as c = cKp + cWpηwp, with cK = 0.474 being a
capital cost and the labour cost cW equal to 4.5% of quarterly wages of a new hire or 11%
of labour productivity.
24As stressed in section 3.1, the correlation between tightness and productivity ρθp is
0.393 in the data and close to 1 in the model. So the wage elasticity ηwp and the ratio
of standard deviations σw/σp are virtually identical in the model, while in the data the
the former is about 60% lower than the latter. In a subsequent paper, Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2007b) address this question and show that adding an additional shock to
non-market activity to the model allows to target both ηwp and σw/σp. The calibration
method they employ is the same as shown in this section.
25Hagedorn and Manovskii react to this point, raising some doubts about the endogene-
ity problems that in cross-country regressions like those performed by Costain and Reiter
cannot be ruled out.
26Actually, in their simulation part, Silva and Toledo get σθ/σp = 20, much larger
than ηθp and very close to the ratio σθ/σp found in the data. Such discrepancy probably
depends on the choice of the grid step size ∆ = 0.053 and the arrival rate λ = 0.4 made
by the authors. These values are not suﬃciently close to 0 for the approximation to hold.
27Wages are volatile because the worker’ outside option, that depends on the current
value of productivity and not on the productivity of the match, is strongly procyclical.
28With long-term contracts and ξp = 0.302, the elasticity of the wages for new entrants
with respect to productivity is about 1, but the elasticity of the aggregate wage results too
small (less than 0.1). Further, turnover costs reduce the amount of endogenous separations.
29A similar eﬀect is obtained by Nagyp´ al (2005) by introducing on-the-job search in the
standard model. A higher separation rate encourages ﬁrms to post more vacancies because
it raises the number of unemployed people, who are the only job seekers in the economy.
In a framework with on-the-job search, an increase in s has a smaller impact on the total
number of searching workers and the incentive for ﬁrms to post more vacancies as s goes
up is weakened.
30On intra-ﬁrm wage bargaining within a matching framework see Cahuc and Wasmer
(2001).
31He also assumes concave vacancy costs that induce ﬁrms to post more vacancies in
booms, so amplifying the volatility of such variable. So, comparing Yashiv’s and Rotem-
berg’s model, one concludes that concave vacancy costs tend to amplify the shocks but
worsen the ability of the model to propagate them. Convex costs engender the opposite
eﬀects.
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